Organizational Liability and the Tension Between Corporate and Criminal Law by Baer, Miriam H.
Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 19 | Issue 1 Article 1
2010
Organizational Liability and the Tension Between
Corporate and Criminal Law
Miriam H. Baer
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Miriam H. Baer, Organizational Liability and the Tension Between Corporate and Criminal Law, 19 J. L. & Pol'y (2010).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol19/iss1/1
 1 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL LIABILITY AND THE 
TENSION BETWEEN CORPORATE AND 
CRIMINAL LAW 
Miriam H. Baer* 
INTRODUCTION 
On February 5, 2010, Brooklyn Law School brought together a 
group of psychologists, philosophers, and corporate criminal law 
experts to explore the implications of blaming corporate groups. 
During the afternoon session, I had the pleasure of moderating a 
roundtable discussion that included Professors James Fanto, Peter 
Henning, and Leonard Orland. The essays that follow are our 
reactions to the wide range of topics we covered with regard to 
organizational criminal liability. 
As the Symposium itself demonstrated, corporate criminal 
liability continues to be an important and complex topic in public 
discourse. Our preoccupation reflects our intuition that wrongdoers 
ought to be punished, and our uneasy relationship with large, 
powerful corporate organizations. We fear both the harms that 
corporate organizations can produce (British Petroleum’s massive 
oil spill being the most recent example), and the agglomeration of 
economic power that they represent. These fears have led us to 
                                                          
* Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn, Law School; J.D. 1996, Harvard Law 
School; A.B. 1993, Princeton University; Assistant United States Attorney, 
Southern District of New York 1999–2004 and Assistant General Counsel for 
Compliance, Verizon, 2004–2005. I am grateful to Jim Fanto, Peter Henning, 
and Leonard Orland, who participated in this Symposium. Their roundtable 
comments, as well as comments and conversations with Dana Brakman-Reiser, 
Michael Cahill, Ted Janger, and Larry Solan, greatly furthered this project. 
Thanks as well are due to President Joan Wexler and Brooklyn Law School for 
hosting this Symposium.  
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adopt various mechanisms for restraining corporate conduct. 
Corporate criminal liability has become, over the years, one of the 
most important of these mechanisms because it stems not only 
from theories of restraint, but also from notions of group blame.1 
The legal equivalent of one-stop shopping, it promises 
consequential, retributive and expressive benefits, all at the same 
time.  
Drawing on psychology and organizational management 
literature, Professor Fanto’s piece explores the extent to which 
group dynamics explain corporate malfeasance and, therefore, 
justify the need for corporate criminal liability.2 Professor Henning 
focuses on several recent cases, which demonstrate criminal 
liability’s imperfect potential for corporate rehabilitation.3  
Together, their comments demonstrate the pragmatic benefits and 
drawbacks of employing the corporate unit as the measure of group 
blame. If we blame the corporation, we can (supposedly) improve 
the organizational dynamics that led to its decline. On the other 
hand, if we blame the corporation, we may (sometimes) impose 
rehabilitative regimes that are less helpful than we presume.4  
In my own contribution, I want to suggest that corporate 
criminal liability, as currently constituted in federal jurisdictions, 
fails to perform the sorting and rehabilitation mechanism that 
Professors Fanto and Henning envision. That is, as a legal matter, 
corporate criminal liability is so broad that it cannot possibly 
                                                          
1 See generally Samuel Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal 
Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473 (2006). For a proposal for using civilly-imposed 
punitive damages to express moral condemnation, see generally Dan Markel, 
Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 
94 CORNELL L. REV. 239 (2009), and Dan Markel, How Should Punitive 
Damages Work?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1383 (2009). 
2 James Fanto, Organizational Liability, 19 J.L. & POL’Y (forthcoming Fall 
2010). 
3 Peter J. Henning, Should the Perception of Corporate Punishment 
Matter?, 19 J.L. & POL’Y (forthcoming Fall 2010). 
4 To this end, the two essays demonstrate the problem that deterrence 
strategies in criminal law “may have hidden crimogenic costs—that is, they may 
generate crime in unexpected ways.” Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The 
Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At its Worst 
When Doing its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949, 951 (2003). 
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identify those corporations whose cultures are particularly corrupt.5 
As a result, corporate criminal liability is not, by itself, a 
particularly good vehicle for rehabilitating corporate culture; 
instead, prosecutors must fill that gap by screening a few 
“unworthy” corporations from a multitude of entities that 
technically qualify for criminal charges.6 As a result, federal 
prosecutors acquire an oversized role in governing corporate 
entities, with little to no oversight from the courts or the public.   
I. THE RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR THEORY OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL 
LIABILITY  
Under our federal law’s respondeat superior theory of criminal 
liability, corporations may be held liable for their employee’s 
crimes, provided the employee acted in the scope of her authority 
and acted with an intention to benefit the corporation.7 The 
Supreme Court originally justified such liability on grounds that 
there existed no other way to restrain business entities, who were 
growing in size and power at the turn of the 20th century during the 
                                                          
5 See Mary Jo White, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Has Gone 
Wrong?, 1517 PLI/CORP. 815, 817 (2005) (describing broad scope of corporate 
criminal liability). 
6 In a 2005 presentation before the Practicing Law Institute, former United 
States Attorney Mary Jo White bluntly reminded her audience of this fact: 
On the federal level especially, the sweep of corporate criminal liability 
could hardly be broader. All of you in this audience probably know the 
law well, but its breathtaking scope always bears repeating: If a single 
employee, however low down in the corporate hierarchy, commits a 
crime in the course of his or her employment, even in part to benefit the 
corporation, the corporate employer is criminally liable for that 
employee’s crime. It is essentially absolute liability. 
Id. 
7 See generally N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 
481 (1909). For early discussions of respondeat superior corporate criminal 
liability, see generally John C. Coffee Jr., Does Unlawful Mean “Criminal”? 
Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 
B.U. L. REV. 193 (1991); Albert W. Alschuler, Ancient Law and the Punishment 
of Corporations: Of Frankpledge and Deodand, 71 B.U. L. REV. 307, 313 
(1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick:” An 
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. 
REV. 386 (1981). 
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industrial revolution.8 Today, however, those concerns are rather 
quaint;9 a host of administrative agencies and civil liability can 
restrain corporate wrongdoing and reduce harmful externalities. 
Why, then, does corporate criminal liability not only persist, but in 
fact flourish? 
Corporate criminal liability relies on what some might call a 
“communitarian” view of the corporation, which posits that the 
corporation is a social institution with an identifiable personality.10 
The communitarian vision of the firm is at odds with the dominant 
view among corporate scholars and jurists, which is that the 
corporation is little more than a nexus of contracts.11   
If the contractarian view dominates the world of corporate law, 
then the communitarian view most surely governs criminal law. As 
the presentations and comments during the Trager Symposium 
demonstrated, the communitarian view is supported by more than 
just scholarly opinion; it also appears to be fueled by powerful 
societal intuitions.12 We can credibly blame the financial 
                                                          
8 N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R., 212 U.S. at 495 (reasoning that criminal 
liability is necessary to restrain corporate wrongdoing). 
9 V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it 
Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1486 (1996) (theorizing that corporate 
criminal liability may have served a “useful purpose” prior to the emergence of 
strong civil enforcement regimes). 
10 See, e.g., Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 455 (2006). “Communitarians insist that corporations 
have political and social dimensions as well as the obvious economic 
dimension.” Another view of the corporation is that it is the equivalent of a 
living, sentient animal. See Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the 
Punishment of Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1374–76 (2009) 
(describing and critiquing theory of corporate punishment that posits a 
corporation as the equivalent of a human being). 
11 William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1400 (1993). 
The dominant legal academic view does not describe the corporation as 
a social institution. Rather, the corporation is seen as the market writ 
small, a web of ongoing contracts (explicit or implicit) between various 
real persons. The notion that corporations are ‘persons’ is seen as a 
weak and unimportant fiction..  
Id. 
12 David G. Trager Public Policy Symposium, Sharing the Blame: The Law 
and Morality of Punishing Collective Entities (Feb. 5, 2010) (unpublished 
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institution known as “Goldman Sachs” because we believe, on 
multiple levels, that Goldman Sachs is an identifiable entity. It 
means something to refer to “Goldman Sachs” and not “Citibank” 
or “Morgan Stanley,” just as it feels different to work for Goldman 
Sachs than it does to work for some other institution. Indeed, it 
feels different to work for any financial institution than it does to 
work for any corporation in some other industry, and so forth. It is 
that feeling, often referred to as “corporate culture,” that allows 
prosecutors both to generate narratives of corporate blame (i.e., the 
“greedy culture” at Goldman led to excessive risk-taking and 
allegedly fraudulent conduct) and invoke notions of just desserts.13 
The communitarian view also enables prosecutors to argue that 
criminal law provides better tools with which to punish or reform 
the previously identified “corporate culture.”14 
Unfortunately, the communitarian approach, as expressed 
through respondeat superior liability, does not do a very good job 
of taking into account differences between firms. Consider two 
primary arguments one might make in defense of a corporation 
whose employees have violated the law:  
—Don’t blame us. Blame our employees or officers. This is 
a variant of a “rogue employee” argument, whereby the 
company as a whole should not suffer the direct and 
indirect costs of a criminal indictment, simply because a 
“rogue” employee made unauthorized decisions (and 
sometimes went to great lengths to hide those decisions) 
while in the company’s employ.15 One should note, 
however, that many of the cases that make the morning 
                                                          
transcript) (on file with Brooklyn Law School Journal of Law & Policy).  
13 See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing 
Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095 (1991) (arguing that 
existence of an identifiable corporate ethos justifies imposition of punishment 
and criminal liability). 
14 Id. at 1123–27. 
15 True, corporations often must pay civil and administrative penalties 
when rogue employees, acting within the scope of their authority, cause harm to 
others. But civil and administrative penalties will often pale in comparison to the 
reputation and collateral costs of a federal criminal indictment. See Miriam 
Hechler Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 IND. L.J. 1035, 1062–63 (2008) 
(citing collateral costs of corporate indictment).  
6 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
papers and evening news are not mere “rogue employee” 
cases. Rather, multiple actors appear to bear varying levels 
of culpability for indirect encouragement or lax oversight 
of violations of law.  
—Don’t punish us. We are just shareholders. The second 
contention is that whatever the culpability of the 
corporation’s employees and officers, criminal corporate 
liability imposes improper burdens on diffuse and largely 
innocent shareholders. This argument is most applicable to 
publicly held corporations whose managers have engaged 
in some variety of corporate fraud. The “shareholders will 
be harmed” argument contends that rather than hurting 
some abstract entity, criminal penalties hurt the 
corporation’s very (human) shareholders, who usually have 
had nothing to do with the underlying wrongdoing and 
indeed may have been the primary victims of 
wrongdoing.16   
As a legal matter, neither claim is relevant within the federal 
system. Corporate criminal liability attaches regardless of whether 
the employee has violated explicit company rules,17 or whether the 
company’s shareholders shared in the corporate employee’s ill-
begotten profits.18   
As a practical matter, however, the issue is more complex. 
                                                          
16 See Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives “Naked, 
Homeless and Without Wheels:” Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies and the 
Debate over Entity Versus Individual Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 
632 (2007). For a similar argument in the securities class action context, see 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on 
Deterrence and its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1537 (2006) 
(observing that securities class action penalty “falls perversely on the victim”).  
17 See OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF 
FEDERAL PROSECUTIONS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, UNITED STATES 
ATTORNEYS MANUAL, TITLE 9, CHAPTER 9-28.000  15, available at http://www. 
justice.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf (citing, e.g., United 
States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that a 
corporation can be held criminally responsible even when its employee’s 
conduct was “against corporate policy or express instructions”)).  
18 Id. at 2–3 (citing authority for the principle that agent must only act with 
partial intent to benefit corporation and that actual benefit is not necessary for 
imposition of criminal liability).  
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Prosecutors clearly do take into account the extent to which the 
employee appears to be “just a rogue,” or in fact a member of an 
institution whose culture demands increased profits at all costs.19 
Moreover, prosecutors and regulators clearly do take into account 
the extent to which the company’s shareholders were themselves 
the victims of a corporate crime, and whether they would suffer 
additionally from the entity’s criminal prosecution.20 Because 
prosecutors are known to make these screening decisions, 
companies retain incentives to employ strong oversight 
mechanisms (or at least mechanisms most likely to please 
prosecutors),21 and to argue that prosecution is undesirable where 
shareholders are most likely to shoulder the costs of a criminal 
indictment.   
When the government does take these arguments into account, 
it does not necessarily decline prosecution and call it a day. 
Instead, it may enter a deferred or non–prosecution agreement, 
whereby the company agrees to pay extensive fines, cease certain 
activities, agree to an outside monitor, and engage in additional 
reforms set out by the relevant prosecutor.22 
                                                          
19 Id. at 4 (directing prosecutors to consider, among other factors, “the 
pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation”). 
20 Id. (directing prosecutors to consider, among other factors, “collateral 
consequences [of prosecuting], including whether there is disproportionate harm 
to shareholders [and other constituents] and others not proven personally 
culpable”). The SEC also has indicated its unwillingness to bring corporate-wide 
enforcement actions that would disproportionately harm shareholders. See Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF 
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND COMMISSION STATEMENT ON THE 
RELATIONSHIP OF COOPERATION TO AGENCY ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS, SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N, RELEASE NO. 44969, 76 SEC DOCKET 296 (Oct. 23, 2001) 
(more commonly known as the “Seaboard Report”), available at http://www. 
sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm#P16_499 (“[T]he paramount issue 
in every enforcement judgment is, and must be, what best protects investors.”). 
The SEC and Department of Justice have potentially conflicting interests insofar 
as the SEC sees its mission as the protection of investors whereas the 
Department of Justice serves the general public. 
21 See Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. 
REV. 949, 990–92 (2009) [hereinafter Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance].  
22 For a discussion of deferred prosecution agreements and the manner by 
which they are negotiated, see generally Leonard Orland, The Transformation of 
Corporate Criminal Law, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 45 (2006); Brandon 
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Thus, we see an interesting divergence between the legal and 
practical implications of the communitarian view of corporate 
wrongdoing; the federal law ignores arguments such as prevalence 
of wrongdoing and damage to shareholders, but prosecutors may 
credit them.23 The problem, however, is that the government’s 
response is entirely discretionary.24 Government prosecutors may 
take these issues into account, but they have no legal obligation to 
do so.25 Moreover, when they do take these arguments into 
account, government actors are relatively unbound by legal 
institutions—administrative or legal—that ensure transparency, 
accountability, and uniformity.26 Indeed, they may be making 
                                                          
L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853 (2007) 
(describing nature of deferred and non–prosecution agreements); Lawrence D. 
Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of Authority: The Department of 
Justice’s Corporate Charging Policies, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1 (2006).   
23 “[I]n the shadow of a strikingly broad de jure rule of liability that is 
nearly indistinguishable from its civil counterparts, the criminal system’s actors 
gradually have developed a practice of imposing enterprise liability that looks 
much narrower . . . .” Buell, supra note 1, at 476.  State laws are more 
constrained in their definition of corporate criminal liability.  See Alschuler, 
supra note 10, at 1364, 1364 n.35 (citing Model Penal Code and state codes).  
24 Prosecutorial discretion has been more broadly criticized in Stephanos 
Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. 959 (2009), declaring in the opening sentence: “No government 
official has as much unreviewable power or discretion as the prosecutor.” Id. at 
959. Professor Pamela Bucy, a former federal prosecutor, has commented that 
the three aspects of the job that surprised her were the solemnity of the 
courtroom, the amount of resources available for investigation and prosecution, 
and “the amount of power [she] and every prosecutor had.” Pamela H. Bucy, 
Moral Messengers: Delegating Prosecutorial Power, 59 SMU L. REV. 321, 321 
(2006). 
25 Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: 
Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 53, 86–87 (2007).  
No amount of supplication, therefore, can overcome the mercilessness 
of the applicable legal doctrines; so long as there is a hint of criminality 
by even a single lowly employee, the corporation’s counsel has no 
leverage and no bargaining power. Only the prosecutor can be merciful, 
and for his mercy the corporation rationally chooses to cooperate in any 
way demanded.  
Id. 
26 Prosecutorial discretion of this type is subject neither to judicial 
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decisions for which they have little expertise or competence.27 
It should come as no surprise, then, that unbound government 
actors sometimes incur agency costs.28 Since government actors 
have no obligation to recognize rogue employee or shareholder-
victim arguments, they can extract personally and politically 
valuable compensation for doing so.29 Ordinarily, the required 
payment is the company’s willingness to cooperate in the 
prosecution of individual employees, as well as its commitment to 
enact certain reforms and policies.30 To the extent these reforms 
                                                          
oversight nor to the administrative restraints set forth in the Administrative 
Procedure Act.  See Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, supra note 21, at 
976–79 (describing breadth of prosecutorial discretion). 
27 Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Limiting 
Prosecutorial Discretion to Impose Structural Reforms, in PROSECUTORS IN THE 
BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT, 
(Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel Barkow eds., forthcoming NYU Press 2011) 
(“Prosecutors rarely have sufficient experience working in any business, much 
less adequate industry-specific expertise, to make these decisions reliably.”) 
(manuscript on file with Brooklyn Journal of Law &Policy). 
28 “Agency costs” are the costs incurred when the principal’s interest 
diverges with those of the agent. To eliminate the agent’s bad conduct, the 
principal must expend resources monitoring and bonding the agent. In the 
corporate crime context, prosecutors in some instances were accused of taking 
actions for their benefit and not for the benefit of shareholders or even society at 
large. For example, when the United States Attorney for New Jersey signed a 
Deferred Prosecution Agreement with Bristol Myers Squibb that required 
Squibb to donate money to Seton Hall Law School (the United States Attorney’s 
alma mater), the payment was denounced as nothing more than a coercive 
wealth transfer with no real value for shareholders or the community. See 
Richard A. Epstein, The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 
2006, at A14 (criticizing DPA’s requirement that Bristol Myers Squibb endow a 
chair in business ethics). This behavior also is an example of “rent seeking” in 
that the prosecutor allegedly used his power to extract transfer from one party 
(Squibb) to another (Seton Hall), rather than securing reforms that would 
increase wealth or at least compensate victims. For more on agency costs and 
rent-seeking behavior, see WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST 66–69, 
87–93 (2007). 
29 For additional examples of the principal-agent problem as it relates to 
prosecutors, see Bibas, supra note 24, at 963 (discussing principal-agent 
problem with regard to plea bargaining and charging decisions). 
30 For examples of deferred prosecution agreements, see authorities cited 
supra note 22. 
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accelerate the identification and prosecution of individuals who 
have transgressed criminal law, corporate criminal liability 
provides useful benefits, some of which Professor Henning rightly 
refers to in his Essay.31   
There is, however, a negative side to corporate criminal 
liability, which, concededly, corporate defenders may be a bit too 
eager to point out.32 Sometimes the government’s proposed 
rehabilitation has little to do with eliminating criminal conduct at 
the individual level, but instead seeks the implementation of 
questionable governance provisions33 or, even worse, requires the 
corporate defendant to make questionable payments to non–victim 
third parties,34 or hand lucrative contracts to government–chosen 
outside monitors.35 
The point here is not that corporate criminal liability is 
impossibly flawed.36 Putting aside the practical and theoretical 
implications of punishing an organization for being “crimogenic,” 
one could at least imagine a plausible legal regime that takes into 
                                                          
31 Peter J. Henning, Should the Perception of Corporate Punishment 
Matter?, 19 J.L. & POL’Y (forthcoming Fall 2010).  
32 Cf. Samuel Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. 
REV. 1613, 1615 & nn.3–4 (2007) (contending that public debate of corporate 
prosecutions has been, at times, “shallow and even shrill”).   
33 See Barry A. Bohrer & Barbara L. Trencher, Prosecution Deferred: 
Exploring the Unintended Consequences and Future of Corporate Cooperation, 
44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1481, 1500–01 (2007) (describing governance obligations 
imposed by prosecutors on Computer Associates and other corporations).  
34 See discussion supra note 28.  
35 See Alschuler, supra note 10, at 1384 (describing John Ashcroft’s 
lucrative deal to monitor a corporation that was the subject of a deferred 
prosecution agreement in New Jersey). Negative publicity generated by the 
choices and costs of several deferred prosecution-induced monitors drove the 
Department of Justice to issue a set of guidelines for prosecutors in choosing 
monitors. See Steven R. Peikin, New Guidelines for Corporate Monitors, 1696 
PLI/CORP 681, 683 (2008). 
36 Nevertheless, some would say just that.  See Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. 
Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 321–22 (1996) (contending 
that where corporations are concerned, criminal liability always is less efficient 
than civil liability). For a response that corporate criminal liability offers unique 
retributive and expressive advantages, see generally Lawrence Friedman, In 
Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 833 
(2000).   
 Organizational Liability 11 
account the extent of the entity’s employee malfeasance and its 
group dynamics, issues that Professor Fanto contends are 
important to consider.37 One could also imagine a transparent and 
consistent system of corporate rehabilitation, the benefits of which 
Professor Henning discusses in his Essay.38 But respondeat 
superior liability does not perform either of these functions. 
Instead, it leaves corporations entirely dependent on 
unaccountable, highly powerful government actors who have their 
own personal and institutional interests.39 It is this very lack of 
accountability that creates the possibility for waste and abuse, the 
costs of which ultimately fall upon corporate shareholders.40 
II. A QUESTION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
If we assume that the root cause of corporate misconduct is that 
managers and officers cannot achieve previously set performance 
goals without resorting to some variety of fraud or intentional 
wrongdoing, then the problem is one of corporate governance, 
which in turn boils down to a reassessment of how we allocate 
power between the owners and managers of the corporate firm.41   
                                                          
37 James Fanto, Organizational Liability, 19 J. L. & POL’Y  (forthcoming 
2010). 
38 Peter J. Henning, Should the Perception of Corporate Punishment 
Matter?, 19 J. L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2010). 
39 For arguments that prosecutors are themselves imperfect agents, see 
Bibas, supra note 24, at 963. I also have argued that prosecutors may seek 
reforms that are designed primarily to aid in the identification and prosecution of 
individuals, rather than to cure structural or cultural governance problems. See 
Miriam Hechler Baer, Corporate Policing and Corporate Governance: What 
Can We Learn from Hewlett-Packard’s Pretexting Scandal?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 
523, 526–28 (2008) (arguing that internal policing mechanisms may conflict 
with corporate governance norms such as openness and loyalty).  
40 These costs fall not only on those shareholders whose companies become 
the subject of criminal investigations and prosecutions, but all shareholders 
insofar as all companies take unnecessary or costly measures to avoid the 
imposition of corporate criminal liability.  
41 Jennifer Arlen and William Carney long ago theorized that corporate 
fraud results from management’s attempt to hide corporate underperformance 
and thereby protect their jobs. Jennifer Arlen & William Carney, Vicarious 
Liability for Fraud in Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 691, 694 (1992). But one need not stop at fraud; rational corporate 
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As has been observed in multiple venues, shareholders have 
little control over the daily affairs of the corporation. For example, 
in Delaware—the state of incorporation for a majority of publicly 
held corporations—the board of directors retains the legal power to 
run the corporation.42 Shareholders retain the power to elect 
directors, amend the corporate charter and bylaws, and approve 
structural changes such as mergers and sales of substantially all of 
the corporation’s assets.43 Beyond these rights, shareholders 
remain limited, practically and legally, in what they can do with 
regard to the company’s internal affairs. “Management” controls 
the corporation’s information flow, access to its treasury, and in 
many respects, access to the corporation’s proxy statement.44 Thus, 
it is no overstatement when Steven Bainbridge observes that 
shareholders, “who are said to ‘own’ the firm, have virtually no 
power to control either its day-to-day operation or its long term 
                                                          
managers seeking to attain previously set performance goals may, when 
sanctions and probability of detection are low, choose other forms of legal 
noncompliance to the extent noncompliance is cheaper.   
42 See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141(West 2010a). This structure is 
replicated in all other states. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 34–35 & n.25  (2008) 
(observing that “[i]n all states, the corporation code provides for a system of 
nearly absolute delegation of power to the board of directors”).   
43 ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING 
CORPORATE LAW 93 (Matthew Bender & Co. Inc. 1999). Under the SEC’s 
shareholder proposal provision, shareholders also may propose and vote on 
certain proposals, provided they are “precatory” or non-binding. See id. at 157; 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (West 2010).  
44 The “proxy” is the statement that enables shareholders to vote on 
corporate matters without attending the company’s annual meeting. See 
generally Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. L.J. 
1259 (2009). In 2009, Delaware amended its code to permit shareholders to 
enact bylaws that required the inclusion of certain shareholder nominations on 
the corporate proxy, as well as the reimbursement of shareholders following a 
successful election. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 112, 113. In August 2010, the 
SEC increased shareholder access by enacting Rule 14a-11, which mandates 
inclusion in the proxy materials of director nominees of shareholders who meet 
minimum requirements set forth in the Rule. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11 and the 
SEC’s discussion of adoption of final rule, Facilitating Shareholder Director 
Nominations, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 25, 2010), available at http://www. 
sec.gov/rules/final/2010/33-9136.pdf.  
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policies.”45  
In an ideal world, the market for corporate control would 
render shareholder democracy unnecessary. This market, however, 
has been severely hampered by state anti–takeover statutes and 
judicially accepted defense mechanisms such as the poison pill.46 
Corporate management thus finds itself with a substantial degree 
of latitude.  
Some contend that this is the optimal structure for promoting 
business in a complex economy;47 others lament that it is a recipe 
for fleecing dispersed and powerless owners.48 This debate is far 
from resolved by the numerous corporate scholars who have 
addressed it, and yet it tends to be ignored by those who populate 
the criminal justice world. Federal prosecutors, however hard they 
try, cannot begin to address these issues, much less remedy them. 
                                                          
45 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 42, at 3.  Moreover, at least prior to the adoption 
of Rule 14a-11, shareholders have had little practical ability to unseat the 
directors of publicly held companies. “[F]or directors of public companies, the 
incidence of replacement by a rival slate seeking to manage the company better 
as a stand-alone entity is negligible.” Lucian Bebchuk, The Myth of the 
Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 677 (2007). For analyses of 
whether this inability will change in light of newly enacted Rule 14a-11, see 
Proxy-Access Forum, THE CONGLOMERATE (Aug. 26-30, 2010), http://www.the 
conglomerate.org/forum-proxy-access/.  
46 See generally JONATHAN MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES 
KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 118 (2008) (observing that “as the scientific evidence 
about the importance of the market for corporate control became so 
overwhelming as to be incontrovertible, regulations impeding the market for 
corporate control became ubiquitous”). For an explanation of poison pills as 
well as a description of other takeover defenses, see generally PINTO & 
BRANSON, supra note 43, at 313–16. 
47 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 42, at 233.  
The chief economic virtue of the public corporation is not that it 
permits the aggregation of large capital pools, but rather that it provides 
a hierarchical decision-making structure well-suited to the problem of 
operating a large business enterprise with numerous employees, 
managers, shareholders, creditors, and other inputs. In such a firm, 
someone must be in charge . . . . 
Id.  
48 Lucian Bebchuk’s scholarship presents the strongest case for increasing 
shareholder power. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing 
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005).  
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Rather, the proper allocation of corporate power is a question for 
state legislatures, state courts, and to an increasing degree, 
Congress and federal agencies such as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”).49 Until the engines of corporate law better 
address the governance issues that lurk behind fraud and 
misconduct, a number of corporate agents will continue to shirk 
and transgress the law, and do their very utmost to hide such 
shirking and transgressions. Perhaps criminal law can do some 
good on the margins, but its benefits must be viewed against its 
costs. If we want deeper and longer lasting change, then we should 
probably look beyond the confines of corporate criminal liability, 
to corporate law itself.  
CONCLUSION 
In this Essay, I have pointed out some of the inherent 
shortcomings of respondeat superior liability, as well as some of 
the underlying tensions between criminal and corporate law. If we 
are serious about improving organizational dynamics, or 
rehabilitating corporate culture, we must take a look at complex 
questions of corporate form and governance and consider the 
extent to which those forms increase or decrease the risk of 
criminal conduct. If we truly want to inspire long term changes in 
corporate culture, then we need to think carefully about how we 
might overhaul corporate and securities laws. Such an overhaul, in 
turn, would require us to give much greater thought as to how we 
can best regulate the corporate firm, our capital markets, and the 
economy in general. On the other hand, it might allow prosecutors 
to go back to doing what they do best: prosecuting individuals. 
 
                                                          
49 For the argument that state law responds in large part to federal law’s 
view of corporate governance, see generally Mark Roe, Delaware and 
Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2009). 
